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Previous research has suggested that after 1996 devolution caused a reduction in
regional disparities in Italy. However the analysis presented here suggests that the
decline in regional disparities in Italy between 1996 and 2006 was driven by popula-
tion dynamics and, to some extent, by the loss of competitiveness and consequent
poor relative performance of northern regions. We conclude that links between
devolution and the reduction of spatial disparities is unproven and its beneﬁts are
temporally and geographically uneven.
Keywords: economic dividend; devolution; spatial disparities; spatial economic
policy; decentralization; Italy
Introduction
Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2003) identify a global trend toward decentralization begin-
ning in the 1970s, reﬂecting the imputed effects of citizens’ participation, greater
accountability and ‘voting with one’s feet’ effects (Oates, 1972, 1999; Rodríguez-Pose,
& Gill, 2005; Tiebout, 1956). Empirical research has tended to focus on the growth-
enhancing effects of devolution, while much less attention has been paid to the effects
of devolution in terms of its contribution to spatial disparities. The empirical evidence is
rather mixed, demonstrating that the effects of devolution on spatial disparities are case
speciﬁc (Calamai, 2009; Pike, Rodríguez-Pose, et al., 2012; Rodríguez-Pose, & Gill,
2004; Tselios, Rodríguez-Pose, et al., 2011). This consideration suggests the case for
further research based on single-country case study.
With regard to the Italian case, it has been argued that a beneﬁcial effect of the
devolutionary process beginning in 1995 – in terms of a reduction of spatial disparities
– arose, even if indirectly (Calamai, 2009). Indeed, over the 10 years following the ﬁrst
introduction of devolutionary measures in Italy, a signiﬁcant reduction of regional
disparities is apparent and in the Italian context this phenomenon has resulted in some
reduction of the ‘North–South divide’. According to Calamai (2009, p. 1140):
Just one year later (1996), the North–South gap, which had been increasing constantly since
the 1980s, started to show a signiﬁcant decline. In addition, the partial association between
the two phenomena is further supported by their markedly high correlation coefﬁcient of
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0.89 (statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level), which suggests, for the period under
consideration, a strong positive correlation between this measure of devolution and the
downturn in regional per capita differentials.
The mechanism through which the devolutionary process operates is illustrated in
Figure 1.
The idea expressed in Figure 1, building on Azfar, Kahkonen et al. (1999), is as fol-
lows. Devolution, by means of proximity to the electorate and enhanced accountability
of local governments, accompanied by a well-developed social fabric and civil society,
indirectly stimulates economic growth and generates ‘a cumulative and self-reinforcing
phenomenon, in which economic dynamism nurtures its legitimacy and thus feeds back
into the devolutionary push’ (Calamai, 2009, p. 1147). This process is further stimulated
by regional policy via both the increased autonomy and Europeanization of development
policy. The remainder of this paper will subject this hypothesis to critical scrutiny in the
Italian case.
Therefore, the operation of the theoretical framework introduced above is worth
exploring empirically building upon institutionalist political economy placed in a histori-
cal and a geographical context and using a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods.
Put differently, since ‘decentralization is not an end in itself but rather should be
designed and evaluated for its ability to achieve broader objectives of […] equity,
efﬁciency, quality and ﬁnancial soundness’ (Bossert, 1998, p. 1513), as a contribution
to the political and economic debate, it is worth enquiring empirically to what extent
the supposed virtuous cycle stemming from the devolution process operates. While the
following analysis is mainly of an exploratory nature, it is able to highlight important
aspects of the issue at hand and, furthermore, is potentially able to contribute to shaping
the research agenda on the link between spatial disparities and devolution.1
The next section brieﬂy reviews empirical studies concerning the effectiveness of
regional policy in reducing regional disparities. The third section considers the evolu-
tion of pivotal socio-economic factors, linked to the devolutionary process, involved
in the economic performance of Italian regions with particular regard to the eventual
shift in Southern variables able to explain the regional convergence registered over
Figure 1. Link between devolution and regional disparities in Italy.
Source: Adapted from Calamai (2009).
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the period considered. The fourth section addresses the issue of ‘what could cause the
reduction of regional disparities?’ proposing a reading in terms of population
dynamics and the relative performance of the Northern regions. The ﬁfth section
offers conclusions.
Regional policy, regional disparities and decentralization in Italy
The long history of Italian economic dualism dates back to the uniﬁcation process in
1861 and successive policies have sought to deal with this phenomenon (Spadavecchia,
2007; Del Monte and De Luzenberger, 1989; for a comparative perspective, see
Bachtler, Wishlade, et al., 2001). This paper focuses on European Union regional policy
in consideration of its pivotal role in national state policy in terms of both ﬁnancial
effort and new procedures. Aiello and Pupo (2012), among others, have observed that
over the period 1996–2006 the total amount of Structural Funds received by Italy was
more than €110 billion. European Union support was distributed in accordance with its
spatial redistributive aim. During the period 1996–2008 the South received a share of
total transfers from the European Union ranging between 70% and 87% of total Italian
transfers.2 More precisely, the South received funds equivalent to about 11% of the total
investments and 40% of public investments, substantially higher than the Centre–North
datum at 1.4% and 9.5% respectively. In addition to the magnitude of spatial redistribu-
tive effort, these ﬁgures also conﬁrm the strong (and persistent) dependency of Southern
economy from policy measures (Aiello and Pupo, 2012). In line with the aim of this
paper we focus on the debate regarding the effectiveness of policy measures in reducing
regional disparities.
There is mixed evidence regarding the effects of European Union regional policy.
Loddo (2006) ﬁnds a positive and signiﬁcant effect of Structural Funds on regional con-
vergence during the 1994–2004 period, albeit with uneven effects, given that expendi-
ture allocated by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) ‘has medium term
positive and signiﬁcant returns while support to agriculture has short-term positive
effects on growth which wane quickly’ (Loddo, 2006, p. 1). Furthermore, Loddo (2006,
p. 1) points out that her results ‘cast some doubt both on the (i) distributive efﬁciency
of resources allocated by European Social Fund (ESF) and (ii) on the effectiveness of
the intervention policies in support to education, human capital and employment’.
However, Aiello and Pupo (2012), in a more recent study, note that during a period
of 25 years (1980–2007), there was
no variation in the distribution of regional GDP [gross domestic product] per-capita: the
regions in which GDP per-capita was below the national average at the beginning occupy
the same positions at the end of the period (the correlation between the series of regional
GDP per-capita at the beginning and end of the period is 0.95) (pp. 403–404)
Moreover, with regard to the magnitude of discrepancy, they also note that ‘in 2006–
2007 the income of an inhabitant of the richest region (Valle d’Aosta) is, on average,
2.6 times higher than that of an inhabitant of the poorest region (Calabria)’ (p. 404).
Focusing attention on the impact of European Union regional policy, their empirical
analysis, taking into account the non-observable regional heterogeneity, the small-sample
bias and the possible endogeneity of Structural Funds, Aiello and Puo reach the
conclusion
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that the divide between the regions has not changed over time and, therefore, even if the
increase of the infrastructure endowment has contributed to determine a greater impact of
the spending in the Mezzogiorno, it is evident that the European cohesion policy has not
fully reached the set objective, that is to reduce the disparities inside each member state.
(p. 409)
More precisely, they ﬁnd a positive impact of European Union funds (0.081 or 0.090
according to different estimation technique, LSDVC or GMM-SYS respectively), but
the magnitude of their estimates implies that, for example, a 10% increase in per capita
European Union spending, on average, results in an increase in the GDP per capita of
about 0.90% or 0.81% respectively according to the estimator applied.
Taking account of these empirical ﬁndings, there is room to doubt the magnitude of
the impact of European Union regional policy in interaction with devolution in reducing
regional disparities.
Evolution of other relevant factors
In order to explore further the link between spatial performance and spatial disparities
in Italy, measures taken from the Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (ISTAT) and which
belong to the Territorial Database for Development Policy (Banca dati territoriale per
le politiche di sviluppo) and which contain data collected speciﬁcally to support policy
monitoring and evaluation inside the Community Support Framework (Quadro Comuni-
tario di Sostegno) are used.3 The database comprises about 160 regional indices divided
into contest indicators (indicatori di contesto chiave) and ‘break variables’ (variabili di
rottura). The latter set consists of 15 variables selected to evaluate ex-ante the impact of
policy actions due to their importance in terms of economic externalities to economic
development. Therefore, this data set represents a powerful instrument in order to search
for a structural change in southern regions, interacting with the devolutionary trend, in
order to improve their economic performance and, in turn, to reduce regional disparities
as theoretically predicted with particular regard to the Italian case by Calamai (2009).4
We consider ﬁrst a general indicator of social capital, political accountability and
participation, which is represented by turnout for the 2005 and 2010 regional elections
considering the 13 regions under Statuto Ordinario rule. The rationale for considering
these regions is twofold. First, because these kinds of regions are potentially more
involved in the increased autonomy arising from the devolutionary process (especially
under the 2001 Constitutional reform5) than regions already enjoying a higher level of
autonomy (Statuto Speciale). Second, in these regions elections are held on the same
days,6 allowing one to control for external factors such as the inﬂuence of electoral par-
ticipation and the economic cycle (Aguilar & Pacek, 2000).
If devolution is aimed at deepening democratic engagement we would expect an
increase in electoral participation, to wit,
By bringing government “closer to the people” […] it is suggested that devolution can […]
generate a renewed sense of engagement and participation in the political process in the ter-
ritories where it is established’ (Scully, Jones, et al., 2004, pp. 519–520).
Furthermore, as already noted, Calamai (2009, p. 1146), with particular regard to the
Italian case, points out that ‘one of the major arguments pointing to the economic bene-
ﬁts of devolution equates proximity to the electorate with the enhanced accountability
Regional Studies, Regional Science 125
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of local governments’. Figure 3 reports the participation rate for 13 regions under
Statuto Ordinario rule relative to both the 2005 and 2010 regional elections. However,
as shown in Figure 3, between 2005 and 2010 in all regions considered the electoral
turnout declined. The highest reduction was registered by Lazio (the difference between
the 2005 and 2010 datum is 11.70), while the lowest has been registered in Basilicata
(where the difference is 4.38). On average the difference between the two was 7.70.
Therefore, it seems that devolution, rather than enhancing citizens’ and decision-makers
and strengthening their role, instead was embroiled in a general ‘public alienation from,
and declining trust in, politicians and the political system’ (Scully et al., 2004, p. 519).
Especially in the South, a possible outcome of this is a self-enhancing vicious cycle
since, as a response to this alienation, political institutions could become ‘less “represen-
tative” of the population, and in turn might incline policy makers to neglect the interests
of social groups among whom electoral participation is lowest’ (p. 519). This circum-
stance, in turn, could have negative overall effects on social capital and social cohesion.
With the aim to analyse the evolution of other relevant factors over time, in what
follows we simultaneously consider further four selected indicators from 1995 to 20077.
The ﬁrst indicator – ‘legality and Social Cohesion’ (index ‘t.09’ – condizioni di legalità
e coesione sociale) – represents an additional indirect measure of social capital mea-
sured as violent crimes per 10,000 inhabitants, while the remaining three indicators –
‘worker productivity in manufacturing industry’ (‘index IV-13 bis’ – produttività del
lavoro nell’industria manifatturiera), ‘innovation ability’ (index ‘IV-19 bis’ – intensità
brevettuale), and ‘economic dependency’ (index ‘R2b’ – grado di indipendenza econo-
mica) – deal with the issue from a strictly economic perspective.
Data are standardized over time for each macro-area in order, ﬁrst, to make a
comparison allowable across macro-area data responding to different metrics and, sec-
ond, to allow to capture, in a more sensitive way, of the relative evolution of Southern
and Islands macro-areas which, in absolute terms, reveals that ‘almost all weaknesses of
the Italian economy are mostly revealed in the South’ (Cannari, Magnani, et al., 2009,
p. 673; present authors’ translation). Therefore, should devolution cause a structural
change able to improve the overall performance of the Southern part of the country
reducing spatial disparities, we would expect to observe a substantial change in key
variables here considered linked with the devolutionary timing. Figure 4 reports the
synoptic view of variables considered over time.
A detailed analysis of the interrelationships between these data and devolution is
beyond this paper’s purpose. However, as an exploratory analysis, it is worth noticing
that, if any, only a negative effect of devolution on socio-economic factors considered
could be traced over the period considered. Indeed, we observe an increase in violent
crimes – i.e. a decrease in legality and social cohesion – involving all macro-areas con-
sidered (Figure 4(a)). As far as workers’ productivity is concerned (Figure 4(b)) we ﬁnd
a rather cyclical trend involving all macro-areas considered. Moreover, closely analysing
the datum relative to Islands, we register that while during the initial period here consid-
ered (1995–99) Islands’ macro-area showed a relatively higher performance than the rest
of the country, in the following phase it started (except for the 2002 datum) to perform
relatively worse (2004–09, therefore even after the devolutionary Constitutional reform
of 2001). Hence, opting for a link between the devolutionary process and the productiv-
ity variables, we emphasize the negative impact of the former on Islands’ economic per-
formance. The empirical evidence regarding innovation ability (Figure 4(c)) highlights a
further negative trend involving all macro-areas considered during the whole sample.
According to this evidence, we would argue that this trend has not been driven by the
126 G. Torrisi et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Po
rts
mo
uth
] a
t 0
7:3
2 2
6 M
arc
h 2
01
5 
devolutionary process. Nevertheless, the funnel-shaped plot, simultaneously considered
with the devolutionary measure adopted during these years, would suggest a ‘race to the
bottom’ scenario where all macro-areas simultaneously experienced a worsening of their
performance over time. Finally, with respect to economic dependency (Figure 4(d)),
there is no strong empirical evidence in favour of a (positive) link between devolution
and this aspect of economic performance. Rather, we observe a general upward trend
with some outlier (especially Island in 2000 and, to some extent, South in 2002).
Overall, the trend registered in our sample does not support the suggestion that any
structural change in the Southern regions allowed them to perform better under the early
devolutionary regime. This negative outcome over time of important socio-economic
factors makes it difﬁcult to link the reduction of regional disparities experienced over
the period under consideration to (potential) beneﬁcial effects of devolution. The link
between devolution and disparities remains unproven.
What could cause the reduction of regional disparities?
The analysis performed in previous sections essentially demonstrated that no single vari-
able taken under consideration registered an historical evolution able to explain empiri-
cally – through the theoretical mechanism reported in Figure 2 – the persistent reduction
in regional disparities registered over the 10-year period from 1996 to 2006. Therefore,
as stated, the analysis – rather than supporting the Calamai’s (2009) argument about the
desirable opposite relation between regional disparities and devolution – creates more
worries about the possibility of reaching a reliable conclusion than it started with.
Given that the virtuous relationship between decentralization and other variables
cannot be conﬁrmed in light of the empirical analysis developed above. Therefore, the
ﬁrst conclusion that could be drawn is based on the argument that the reduction of dis-
parities, rather than representing the result of endogenous factors fostering economic
performance, is primarily driven by the strong redistributive effort operated by the state.
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Figure 2. Evolution of regional disparities and ﬁscal devolution in Italy. Fiscal devolution is the
share of local revenue from total government revenue; the Gini index is an index of regional gross
disposable household income per head (GDHI).
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat (2010).
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This argument is conﬁrmed by Figure 5 which reports the evolution of primary and
disposable household income (as a share of Italy’s total primary and disposable house-
hold income, respectively) according to macro-area over the period 1995–2009. Indeed,
Figure 3. Electoral turnout. For regions’ abbreviations, see Table A1.
Source: Authors’ elaboration of ISTAT (2010).
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it is evident that the Italian South uniquely has a share of disposable income (i.e. after
state intervention) substantially higher than primary income (i.e. before state interven-
tion). Furthermore, this circumstance is strongly persistent over time and despite the
strong inter-regional redistributive effort and the observed reduction of regional dispari-
ties over time, the intra-regional relative poverty is substantially stable over time. The
South registers a share of relative poverty (23.38% on average, ranging from 21.6% in
2003 to 25.0% in 2004), more than twice those of other macro-areas of the country; the
North ranges from 4.5% (in 2005) to 6.0% (in 1997) and the Centre ranges from 5.8%
(in 2003) to 9.7% (in 2000). Therefore, the reduction of regional disparities observed
over the period under investigation has not been accompanied by a corresponding
reduction of intra-regional disparities (rather relative poverty) and this circumstance in
itself is another factor that casts doubt on the link between devolution and the reduction
disparities. Indeed, one key argument in favour of devolution is based on better targeted
policies due to an improved information set available at the local level.
Considering redistribution as a public good (Pauly, 1973) and adopting Hochman
and Rodgers’ (1969) approach based on the interdependence of utilities function
between rich and poor, the redistributive effort theoretically could be Pareto-efﬁcient in
a decentralized setting. Nevertheless, our analysis conﬁrms that the devolutionary pro-
cess, in all Italian macro-areas considered, was unable to produce any signiﬁcant effect
in this regard. Devolution had a limited effect, if any, at reducing between disparities
without changing the structure of relative intra-regional poverty. While the issue of the
focus of analysis either on income distribution or on poverty is still debated in political
and academic discourse (Sutcliffe, 2004), there is empirical evidence that the devolu-
tionary process in Italy has been unable to stimulate a ‘pro-poor growth’ (Sutcliffe,
2004, p. 19), therefore contrasting with an argument generally suggesting a reduction of
poverty not inequality (Feldstein, 1999) in order to increase Pareto-efﬁciency.
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Hence, it is reasonable to argue that overall reduction of regional disparities arising
from higher economic growth in the South of Italy is simply due to European transfers
(Aiello and Pupo, 2012). Furthermore, the rise in per capita income was not accompa-
nied by any signiﬁcant change in critical variables able to (explain and) stimulate self-
enhancing endogenous development, or with any reduction of regional poverty. The
positive signal consisting in the reduction of regional disparities could be, therefore,
essentially attributed to external factors, mainly income support measures, representing,
rather than economic development, indices of persistent high economic dependency.
In addition to the different outcome of income support measures between the South
and the rest of the country – operating at the numerator level – closely considering the
dynamic of population, which represents the denominator used to normalize income
measures, it is worth noting that, as shown in Figure 6, the Southern population con-
stantly decreased over the period ranging from 1996 (20,667,800 of inhabitants) to 2002
(20,527,700 of inhabitants) while the Centre–North constantly increased over the whole
period 1995–2009 passing from 36,176,600 to 39,369,800, respectively. More precisely,
according to the SVIMEZ Report (2009) (i.e. Associazione per lo Sviluppo dell’Indu-
stria nel Mezzogiorno) between 1997 and 2008 the Mezzogiorno registered an outward
ﬂow of about 700,000 inhabitants; only in 2008 did internal migration in favour of the
Centre–Northern regions amounted to 122,000 inhabitants, 87% of which came from
Campania (25,000), Puglia (12,200) and Sicilia (11,600).
In principle, this internal migration is not a negative per se. Indeed, from a strictly
economic point of view, according to the neoclassical paradigm, input factor mobility is
a key factor to achieve higher economic performance. Nevertheless, from the devolu-
tionary perspective, it was also once considered that the South–North ﬂow mainly com-
prises highly skilled workers (SVIMEZ, 2009), and this undermines the possibility of
place-based development approaches that emphasize endogenous development. Instead,
it could be interpreted, once more, as a sort of exit (Hirschman, 1985) option also in
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Figure 6. Evolution of the Italian population: macro-areas.
Source: Authors’ elaboration of data from ISTAT.
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response to the low performance of Southern local governments in stimulating economic
development. However, undoubtedly the internal dynamic of the population, in spite of
the fact that it has been driven by the relatively low economic performance of Southern
regions generating high unemployment rates, quite paradoxically ampliﬁed the down-
ward trend of per capita regional disparities. For example, in 2008, the share of South-
ern GDP of national GDP is about 24% – substantially unchanged since 1951 – while
the per capita value of the Southern share in the Centre–North GDP (€30,380 and
€17,482 respectively) is about 60% (SVIMEZ, 2008).
This aspect is further investigated by comparing the cumulative GDP growth
between 1995 and 2007 according to ﬁve different macro-areas. Figure 7(a), reporting
per capita values, shows that both the North-East and the North-West macro-areas regis-
tered a (cumulative) growth rate lower than the rest of the country, especially after the
year 2000. Moreover, the South, beginning from 1996, shows the highest economic per-
formance between the macro-areas. In Figure 7(b), absolute values, the picture is quite
different. In this case, even if the North-West displays a relatively low cumulative
growth, the North-East datum is higher than national growth for the whole period con-
sidered (even if both in 1998 and 2001 the macro-areas registered cumulative growth
roughly equal to the national one). The Islands, in contrast to per capita values, show a
downward trend since 1998, joined by the Southern macro-area since 2002, exactly one
year after the devolutionary Constitutional reform of 2001. Only the Centre seems to
display relatively good economic performance according to both measures.
Therefore, not considering the dynamic of the population and its effects on regional
– per capita – income, the ‘convergence’ produced shows different magnitude and
trends. The Gini index for absolute values (Figure 8) ranges between a maximum and
minimum of 0.509 (in 1995) and 0.504 (in 2002), substantially higher than the corre-
sponding extremes registered by the per capita ﬁgures of 0.135 and 0.113 in 1995 and
2007 respectively. Put differently, the maximum–minimum difference in the Gini index
(absolute values) of only 0005 results, due to population dynamics, in a difference
(0.02) four times higher in per capita values. Moreover, the continuous downward trend
of regional disparities registered in the case of per capita values is not conﬁrmed by
absolute values. Although a reduction of disparities in absolute values arose during the
period 1995–2001, beginning from 2002 (once more, just a year after the devolutionist
Constitutional reform in 2001) regional disparities started to increase.
-.0
6
-.0
4
-.0
2
0
.0
2
.0
4
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
North-West Nord-East
Centre Italy South Italy
Islands
(GDP in Euros per Inhabitant)
Italy = 0
Cumulative Differential Growth from Italy(a) (b)
Figure 7. Cumulative differential growth from Italy.
Source: Authors’ elaboration of data from Eurostat.
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The dynamic described above challenges the argument in favour of the positive
effects of devolution in realizing every place’s economic potential and casts doubts
about whether devolution has contributed to the reduction of inequalities across the
Italian regions. To analyse further the potential beneﬁcial effects of devolution on spatial
disparities we also consider the issue of polarization. Given the strong spatial autocorre-
lation of measures of income in Italy, the expression of the North–South divide (Esteban
& Ray, 1994), it is well known that income inequality measures could give a picture
quite different from polarization measures. More precisely, it could be the case that (at
least) some Southern regions, stimulated also by the devolutionary trend, activate their
own economic dynamic behaving, in terms of Esteban and Ray (1994), less as a single
‘cluster’ reducing overall polarization. To this end we use the generalized Esteban,
Gardìn, and Ray (2007) (EGR) polarization index:
PEGR f ; a; q; bð Þ ¼ 1
2
Xm
j¼1
Xm
K¼1
p1þaj pk l0j  l0k
  b G fð Þ  G qð Þð Þ
 !
(1)
where l’j and pjrepresent respectively the (corrected) average income and the numerical
weight of group j; a ∈ [1,1.6] is the parameter that captures the degree of sensitivity of
the measure of polarization; and is the parameter used to express the weight assigned to
the error term G fð Þ  G qð Þð Þ in determining group composition (Duro, 2005; Esteban
& Ray, 1994). This measure involves the division of the original population into a
number of signiﬁcant homogeneous groups (within-homogeneity condition) to obtain
high heterogeneity between groups. Adopting the methodology proposed by Aghevli
and Mehran (1981) and Davies and Shorrocks (1989), both the two and three groups
cases have been considered. Results are reported in Table 1.
In computing this index, contrary to expectations based on a pro-devolution argu-
ment, for the partition into both two and three groups, over the whole period considered
(1995–2007), Southern regions (Abruzzi, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise, Puglia,
.5
04
.5
05
.5
06
.5
07
.5
08
.5
09
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
(Gini index of disposable household income, absolute values, PPS)
Evolution of Regional Disparities
Figure 8. Evolution of regional disparities (gross disposable household income per head (GDHI)
in absolute values). Gini index is the index of regional GDHI.
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat (2010).
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Sardinia and Sicilia) belong to the lower-income group (or cluster), conﬁrming the cir-
cumstance that their income dynamic follows a single trend over time. Instead, Northern
regions are subject to a relative repositioning process.8 This phenomenon is apparent,
for example, in 2001. Considering three income groups,9 regions (Lombardy, Piedmont,
Valle d’Aosta and Veneto) and the Provincia Autonoma Trento register a shift from the
high-income group to the medium-income group, with a consequent reduction of polari-
zation passing from 0.023076 (in the previous year) to 0.021995. Table 2 reports the
evolution of the subdivision of the whole set of regions into the three income groups
following the Davies and Shorrocks (1989) algorithm. Namely, low income (group 1),
medium income (group 2) and high income (group 3) according to the upper and lower
bounds reported for each year in Table 1.
In terms of a North–South divide, the analysis of polarization seems to conﬁrm that,
rather than ﬁlling the gap, regions (or members) belonging to the Southern cluster are
constantly ‘similar’ over time. However, the remaining regions are becoming less ‘dis-
similar’, reducing the overall polarization.
To summarize, the evolution of regional disparities is far from showing a desirable
opposite link with the devolutionary process. Indeed, the reduction registered in per
capita values is hardly linked with theoretical arguments proposing devolution as a
socio-economic stimulating factor, and the reduction of regional disparities itself, essen-
tially driven by the decline of (richer) Northern regions, (1) appears to be ineffective in
reducing within disparities, (2) is not supported by endogenous economic performance
and (3) is rather limited in both time and magnitude.
Conclusions
This paper critically considered the link between the evolution of regional disparities
and devolution in Italy. The analysis contributes to the existing literature that has empir-
ically investigated the historical path of a set of socio-economic factors which, theoreti-
cally, should underpin a virtuous cycle of development initiated by the devolution of
political power. In the Italian case, this kind of analysis unavoidably involves the issue
of a North–South divide.
Contrary to the theoretical argument and previous Italian case studies, and adding a
consideration of ﬁscal devolution, this exploratory analysis shows that the evolution of
factors that underpin regional development cannot explain the reduction of regional dis-
parities in per capita (GDHI) registered over the period 1995–2007. Moreover, the
reduction in inter-regional disparities over this period has not been accompanied by any
substantial reduction of poverty within the South.
Our interpretation of these ﬁndings, augmented by a polarization analysis, is that the
process of change has been driven by the dynamic of population change, generally ame-
liorating Southern per capita values, and by the weakening of (richer) Northern regions
in terms of economic performance. Clearly, this does not imply that devolution has no
positive effect on spatial economic performance and regional disparities; however, these
effects have to be further investigated and, moreover, might require more time in order
to be effective in improving socio-economic factors and overall regional performance,
especially in the South of Italy.
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Notes
1. For example, both a simultaneous equations model (SEM) involving the variables at hand
could be estimated and a fuzzy clustering analysis (FCA) could be used to explore further the
dynamics of group of regions.
2. Figures are based on the authors’ elaboration of regional public accounts (http://www.dps.
gov.it/it/cpt/).
3. For further information, see http://www.istat.it/ambiente/contesto/infoterr/azioneB.html/.
4. See also Figure 2.
5. Cost. L. 2001, n. 3 Modiﬁche al titolo V della parte seconda della Costituzione. Gazzetta
Ufﬁciale, no. 248, 24 October 2001.
6. Except for Basilicata in 2005 that had an election between 17 and 18 April instead of
between 3 and 4 April.
7. The datum on workers’ productivity is available until 2009.
8. Both the North East and North West macro-areas reduced their share of total gross disposable
household income per head (GDHI) in 2007 with respect to the 1995 datum, passing from
30.02% and 23.29% (in 1995) to 29.09% and 22.78% (in 2007), respectively.
9. The income groups are deﬁned using the Davies and Shorrocks (1989) algorithm. As reported
in Table 1, for 2001 they are deﬁned as follows: low income between 9937.500 and
14266.739; medium income between 14266.739 and 18688.316; and high income between
18688.316 and 21008.000. Data are expressed in purchasing power standard based on ﬁnal
consumption per inhabitant.
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Appendix
Table A1. Regions abbreviations and composition of macro-areas.
Nord-West
Piedmont PI
Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste VA
Liguria LI
Lombardy LO
Nord-East
Provincia Autonoma Bolzano/Bozen
Provincia Autonoma Trento
Veneto VE
Friuli-Venezia Giulia FR
Emilia-Romagna ER
Centre
Toscana TO
Umbria UM
Marche MA
Lazio LA
South
Abruzzi AB
Molise MO
Campania CM
Puglia PU
Basilicata BA
Calabria CL
Islandsa
Sicilia SI
Sardegna SA
Note: aIf not separately considered Islands are included in the South macro-area.
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